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I. INTRODUCTION
During the first half of the 1970's, eager journalists recognized
that an invaluable source of information about the private lives of
public figures lay buried in their garbage cans. As a result, this period
saw the emergence of a journalistic trend in which a number of re-
porters began to collect and rifle through the trash bags of various
celebrities, with Henry Kissinger's garbage apparently being a favorite
target.' Society's reaction to this trend was generally one of fervent
disapproval. One journalist, focusing on the searches of Mr. Kissin-
ger's garbage, called the behavior of his colleagues "a disgusting in-
vasion of personal privacy." ' 2 Another journalist said, "There are
certain basic conditions, certain vulnerabilities, to all our lives -
public and private figures alike - that we must be able to assume
others will not take unfair advantage of."3
1. Journalist A. J. Weberman attempted to secure Kissinger's garbage bags in 1971. See We-
berman, The Art of Garbage Analysis: You are What You Throw Away, 76 ESQUIME 113 (1971). In
1975, journalist Jay Gourley reportedly took five bags of Kissinger's garbage from his home, N.Y.
Times, July 9, 1975, § 1, at 47, col. 1.
2. Flieger, Investigative Trash, U.S. NEws & WosumD REPORT, at 72, July 28, 1975.
3. Washington Post, July 10, 1975, § 1, at 18, col. 1.
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Unquestionably, the Constitution does not protect individuals from
the intrusive searches of their debris by journalists. However, the
negative public reaction to such searches is clearly illustrative of so-
ciety's recognition that garbage harbors intimate details and secrets
of one's private life which ought to remain private. Therefore, it
seems to be a fair question to ask whether this particular privacy
interest is constitutionally protected from unreasonable searches by
governmental officials under the fourth amendment, 4 especially in the
context of warrantless searches of garbage by an officer of the law
who is seeking evidence of illicit activity for criminal prosecution.
Ironically, at approximately the same time journalists were being
chastised for seeking interesting "tidbits" from garbage to increase
newspaper sales, state' and federal6 courts were beginning to hold
that a criminal suspect's expectation of privacy in his garbage, dis-
carded in public areas, was not reasonable. However, in the 1971
decision People v. Krivda,7 the California Supreme Court extended
fourth amendment protection to a defendant's trash cans by holding
that the warrantless police search of defendant Krivda's garbage con-
stituted an unreasonable governmental intrusion.' The Krivda court
ordered the suppression of evidence seized in this illegal search and
seizure. 9
4. The fourth amendment states that people have the right to be secure from unreasonable,
warrantless, governmental searches and seizures of "their person, houses, papers, and effects . .. ."
U.S. Const. amend. IV. This amendment was clearly written to protect people rather than places. Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Therefore, "[t]he touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis
is whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy [in the items
searched by the government without a warrant issued upon probable cause.]' " California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). In determining whether a warrantless police search violates the fourth amend-
ment, the United States Supreme Court applies the following inquiry: whether an individual manifests
a subjective expectation of privacy in the object searched, which society is willing to recognize as ob-
jectively reasonable. Katz at 361.
5. See, e.g., People v. Huddleston, 38 IlI. App. 3d 277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976); Willis v. State,
518 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1086 (1973); State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 503 P.2d 807 (1972); Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122
(,Vyo. 1970); State v. Purvis, 249 Ore. 404, 438 P.2d 1002 (1968).
6. See, e.g., Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mustone, 469
F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1972).
7. People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971) cert. granted, 405
U.S. 1039, vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 367, 486 P.2d at 1269, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
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Encouraged by this decision, defendants from other jurisdictions
in similar situations argued for fourth amendment protection of their
garbage. 10 However, most of these defendants were unsuccessful. Cal-
ifornia remained the only state to recognize this protection until the
Supreme Court of Hawaii, in 1985, held that "defendants have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their trash bags . . .,,
After 1982, California law enforcers believed that the state had
abandoned its protection of garbage, previously afforded by the Krivda
decision, when it amended its constitution to bar the suppression of
any relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding (presumably even ev-
idence seized in violation of a suspect's state right to be free from
illegal searches and seizures or right to privacy). 12 In its 1985 decision
In re Lance W.,13 the Supreme Court of California interpreted this
amendment to permit the exclusion of unlawfully obtained, relevant
evidence only if the exclusion of such evidence is required by the
United States Constitution. 14 Because Krivda was decided not only
on grounds of state protection, but also on federal fourth amendment
protection, the federal aspect of the protection in Krivda survived
even after 1982.15 Therefore, California authorities questioned whether
the fourth amendment prohibits the warrantless search and seizure
of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home (beyond
a person's yard or garden, normally on a public street). 16 This ques-
10. See infra notes 4041 and accompanying text.
11. Hawaii v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 662, 701 P.2d 1274, 1277 (1985).
12. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. This amendment is entitled "Victims' Bill of Rights." Its stated
purpose is to ensure that persons who commit felonies will be appropriately detained, tried, and punished
so that public safety is protected and encouraged. In order to achieve this desired goal, subdivision (d)
of this amendment reads, "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including
pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal
offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court." Id. at art. I, § 28(d).
13. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
14. Id. at 890, 694 P.2d at 755, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
15. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d at 365, 486 P.2d at 1267, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
16. "The word curtilage originally signified the land with the castle and out-houses, enclosed often
with high stone walls, and where the old barons sometimes held their court in the open air, and which
word we have corrupted into court-yard." Coddington v. Dry Dock Co., 31 N.J.L. 477, 485 (1863).
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals held in Coddington that curtilage not only included the
lot surrounding a city home, but also included all out-houses, barns, stables, mills, and adjoining lands
to a country estate as well. Id. at 484.
The United States Supreme Court established a more modem definition of curtilage in the 1987
decision, United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987). The Court held that although fourth amendment
1989]
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tion ultimately was answered in California v. Greenwood,7 in which
the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment
does not prohibit such a search. 18
This Note examines the Greenwood decision and focuses on the
reasonableness of the decision. First, it summarizes the Supreme
Court's opinion in Greenwood with a discussion of both the majority
and dissenting opinions. Second, it explores the evolution of fourth
amendment interpretation, noting how the Court has attempted to
maintain a balance between the need for individual privacy rights and
the need for police latitude in the incarceration and conviction of
criminal suspects. 19 Finally, this Note analyzes the validity of the ra-
tionales employed by the authors of both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Greenwood.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts of California v. Greenwood
In early February 1984, Laguna Beach Police Investigator Jenny
Stracner received several tips indicating that Billy Greenwood might
protection does not extend to open fields, it does protect the curtilage of a home. Id. at 1139. The
Court then announced a four-factor test to be applied case by case in determining whether an individual
may reasonably expect the area in question to be considered curtilage. Id. The four factors are as follows:
"[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether the area is included
within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and [4]
the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Id. The
Court warned that these factors do not constitute a finely tuned formula that mechanically produces
the correct answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions but that "these factors are useful analytical tools
• . . [for determining] whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should
be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." Id.
17. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
18. Id. at 1627.
19. For purposes of this article, the discussion of privacy rights is limited to the scope of criminal
procedure. This article discusses the issue of privacy as it relates to searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment only. It does not address: 1) the privacy rights involved in the conceiving and bearing
of children, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (expanding privacy to allow the use of
contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (expanding privacy to allow a woman to have an
abortion); 2) the privacy rights involved in familial relationships, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (expanding privacy to allow cohabitation among extended family members); or 3)
the privacy rights involved in extramarital, sexual relationships, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (narrowing privacy to disallow homosexual sodomy). These issues are beyond the intended breadth
of this article and are not discussed herein.
[Vol. 91
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be involved in narcotics trafficking. 2° From February 14 to February
23, 1984, Stracner made various attempts to secure positive evidence
of Greenwood's involvement in the sale of illicit drugs, but all such
attempts proved futile.2' Discouraged by her continued failure to ob-
tain the necessary proof, Stracner decided to monitor and to search
Greenwood's garbage, which was set out for collection in front of
his house."
On April 6, 1984, pursuant to a request by Stracner, the neigh-
borhood's regular trash collector cleaned the bin of his truck of other
refuse, collected the garbage bags from the street in front of Green-
wood's home, and gave the bags to Stracner.2 A search of the rubbish
revealed items that Stracner believed to be indicative of narcotics
use.24 By describing these items in an affidavit, Stracner was able to
obtain a warrant to search Greenwood's home.25 Large quantities of
cocaine and hashish were discovered inside the Greenwood residence
when the search warrant was executed later the same evening.26 Green-
wood was arrested along with two other individuals who were inside
the house at the time of the search.27 All three posted bail.2
Subsequent to the arrest, Police Investigator Robert Rahaeuser,
on three separate occasions between April 16 and May 3, 1984, re-
ceived complaints of Greenwood's continued drug trafficking activ-
20. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540 (1986), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 3260 (1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
21. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
22. Id.
23. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
24. Inside Greenwood's trash bags, Officer Stracner found "bindles," straws, and baggies with
residue of cocaine. Brief for Respondent at 1, Greenwood, 108 S. Ct 1625 (1988) (No. 86-684). A
"bindle" is defined as "a package, especially one of morphine or cocaine." WEBSTER's NEw INTER-
NATIONAL DICTiONARY oF THE ENGUH LA GUAGE 270 (2d ed. 1934).
25. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
26. Id.
27. People v. Greenwood, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 733, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541. The other two in-
dividuals arrested were Dyanne Van Houten and Cathy Allegar. During the search of Greenwood's
home, police found Van Houten's purse and searched it. Inside, they discovered cocaine. Allegar was
not a named respondent in this case. However, Van Houten was named, along with Greenwood, as
a respondent in this action. The search of Van Houten's purse "was predicated on the warrant for
Greenwood's house, where . . . [she] probably also had an expectation of privacy due to her physical
presence at the time the search warrant was executed." Id. at 735, 227 Cal. Rptr at 542.
28. Id. at 733, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
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ities. 29 On May 4, Rahaeuser obtained Greenwood's garbage in the
same manner as had Stracner.3 0 Rahaeuser secured a second search
warrant based on the evidence of narcotics use gleaned from Green-
wood's garbage.3' More evidence of narcotics trafficking was dis-
covered at Greenwood's home when the warrant was executed, and
Greenwood again was arrested.32
B. Posture
Following his arrests, Greenwood moved for suppression of the
evidence seized in his home pursuant to these warrants. 3 This motion,
made before the magistrate, was based upon Greenwood's contention
that the warrantless search of his garbage by police investigators was
illegal and that the evidence flowing out of the illegal search should
not have been used to obtain a warrant for the search of his home.34
Greenwood based his contention upon People v. Krivda,35 in which
the California Supreme Court had held that an individual's placement
of trash barrels onto a public sidewalk for collection does not con-
stitute an abandonment of the refuse therein. Moreover, the Krivda
court had held that individuals maintain a reasonable privacy ex-
pectation that their trash will not be rummaged through and picked
over by police officers acting without a search warrant. 37
Despite Krivda, the magistrate at the preliminary hearing upheld
both warrants.38 The California Superior Court, however, disagreed
and granted Greenwood's motion to set aside the information, con-
cluding that Greenwood's earlier motion to suppress evidence should
have been granted at the preliminary hearing. 39 The prosecution
brought an appeal before the California Court of Appeals, Fourth
29. Id.
30. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 227 Cal. Rptr at 540.
34. Id. at 733-34, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
35. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62.
36. Id. at 367, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
37. Id.
38. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
39. Id.
[Vol. 91
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District, arguing that the Krivda decision was erroneous and directly
contradictory to the majority view of federal circuit courts4 and other
state courts41 on this very question.42 Nevertheless, the Court of Ap-
peals held that because it was bound by the California Supreme Court's
interpretation of the fourth amendment in Krivda under the doctrine
of stare decisis, it was thereby compelled to affirm the holding of
that supreme court.43 On June 26, 1987, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari."4
C. The Majority Opinion
In a six to two opinion, Justice White, writing for the majority,45
applied a twofold test in determining whether the warrantless search
40. See, United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986) (evidence of suspect's
laundering of narcotics trafficking funds, obtained from his garbage placed at curbside outside his home);
United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) (evidence showing that suspect had made
false statements on applications for passports found in briefcase which had been placed next to an
overflowing trash dumpster on a busy city street); United States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir.
1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984) (evidence of conspiracy to bomb an automobile seized from
communal trash bin of suspect's apartment complex); United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (evidence of illegal gambling obtained from trash can located in alley behind suspect's apart-
ment); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983) (evidence
of drug trafficking and tax evasion found in garbage removed from suspect's property by police); United
States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980) (evidence of illegal
drug distribution obtained from garbage that suspect had placed at curb in front of his home); Magda
v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1976) (evidence of burglary gleaned from garbage placed on treelawn
next to street adjacent to suspect's home); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1972)
(evidence of counterfeiting in garbage bags on sidewalk several doors from suspect's home).
41. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973);
State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 503 P.2d 807 (1972); State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. App. 1980);
People v. Huddleston, 38 111. App. 3d 277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976); Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397
Mass. 508, 492 N.E.2d 719 (1986); People v. Whotte, 113 Mich. App. 12, 317 N.W.2d 266 (1982); State
v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1982); State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 244 (N.D. 1985); State v.
Brown, 20 Ohio App. 3d 36, 484 N.E.2d 215 (1984); Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653 (Okla. Crirn. App.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985); State v. Purvis, 249 Ore. 404, 438 P.2d 1002 (1968); Com-
monwealth v. Minton, 288 Pa. Super. 381, 432 A.2d 212 (1981); Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d 247 (rex.
Crim. App. 1975); State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 367 N.W.2d 788 (1985) cert. denied, 474 U.S.
852 (1985); Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122 (Vyo. 1970). But see, Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262,
96 Cal. Rptr. 62; State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985).
42. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
43. Id. at 734, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
44. California v. Greenwood, 107 S. Ct. 3260.
45. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by Justice
Marshall. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Greenwood, 108
S. Ct. at 1627.
19891
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and seizure of Greenwood's garbage, left for collection outside the
curtilage of his home, constituted a violation of the fourth amend-
ment.46 This two-pronged analysis has been used by the Court in
resolving fourth amendment protection questions since it was first
expressed by Justice Harlan in his concurrence with the majority in
Katz v. United States.47 To find a constitutional privacy interest the
test requires: "first that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation . . . [is] one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' ' 48 In adapting
this test to the situation at hand, Justice White stated that the war-
rantless search of Greenwood's garbage would be found to violate
the fourth amendment "only if. . . [Greenwood] manifested a sub-
jective expectation of privacy in. . . [his] garbage that society accepts
as objectively reasonable. '49
Because the first part of this test pertains to the defendant's sub-
jective expectation, it is quite easy for a defendant to prove. Thus,
Justice White conceded arguendo that Greenwood may have possessed
a subjective expectation of privacy with respect to his garbage. 0 How-
ever, without something more, "[a]n expectation of privacy [alone]
does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection. ... 51 This
something more is what constitutes the second prong of the Court's
test: the defendant's privacy expectation must be deemed reasonable
by society. The Supreme Court held that Greenwood's expectation
of privacy in the items he discarded fell short of fourth amendment
protection because society is unwilling to accept such a privacy ex-
pectation as being reasonable.12 The majority noted that Greenwood
placed his plastic garbage bags on the public street where their con-
tents could easily be disturbed by "animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public." 53 Furthermore, his very
purpose in placing the garbage on the street was to convey it to a
46. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. People v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1628-29 (Court's footnotes are omitted).
[Vol. 91
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 14
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/14
CALIFORNIA v. GREENWOOD
trash collector, who could have sorted through the bags himself or
"permitted others, such as the police, to do so.''54 Thus, the majority
reasoned, Greenwood knowingly and voluntarily exposed to the pub-
lic the evidence of his criminal activity, and in so doing, he unwit-
tingly relinquished his rights to fourth amendment protection of that
evidence.5 The majority opinion concluded by quoting Justice Black-
mun in Smith v. Maryland:16 "[A] person has no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties. ' '5 7
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan began his dissent by comparing Greenwood's
sealed, opaque trash bags to other containers which the Court has
found to be worthy of fourth amendment protection. Brennan cited
the 1981 Supreme Court decision Robbins v. California,8 which held
that "[w]hat one person may put into a suitcase, another may put
into a paper bag . .. [thus] . . . no court, no constable, [and] no
citizen, can sensibly be asked to distinguish the relative 'privacy in-
terests' in a closed suitcase, briefcase, portfolio, dufflebag, or box."5 9
Justice Brennan hypothesized that had Greenwood been carrying his
personal belongings in garbage bags identical to those he set out for
collection, the contents of those bags would certainly have been pro-
tected by the fourth amendment 0 Therefore, he concluded, Green-
wood deserves no less protection just because he "used the bags to
discard rather than to transport his personal effects.''61
Furthermore, Justice Brennan warned that much about an indi-
vidual can be determined by examining his garbage.6 2 A search of a
person's garbage can reveal his "eating, reading, and recreational
54. Id. at 1629.
55. Id.
56. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
57. Id. at 743-44.
58. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
59. Id. at 426-27.
60. People v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1634.
1989]
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habits .. .the intimate details about [his] sexual practices, health,
and personal hygiene . . .[his] financial and professional status, po-
litical affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts, personal rela-
tionships, and romantic interests." 6 Thus, Justice Brennan speculated
that "society will be shocked to learn that the Court, the ultimate
guarantor of liberty, deems unreasonable our expectation that the
aspects of our private lives that are concealed safely in a trash bag
will not become public." 64
Had Greenwood himself or some non-governmental intruder re-
vealed the contents of these bags to the public by strewing the trash
all over the public street, or had the police somehow found and iden-
tified Greenwood's incriminating trash when commingled with the
trash of others at a public dump, then the majority's holding would
have been proper in Justice Brennan's eyes.65 Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the majority had painted a grim picture of the future for
individual liberties. 6
III. PRIOR LAW
Any fourth amendment analysis must begin with an examination
of the text of the fourth amendment itself:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 67
The framers' purpose in drafting this amendment as part of the Bill
of Rights was to enumerate and to limit the powers of the national
government. 68 Thus, the fourth amendment was initially enforced only
against the federal government and not against the individual states. 69
A. The Exclusionary Rule
The first major jurisprudential development in fourth amendment
interpretation occurred in 1914 in the Weeks v. United States70 de-
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1632.
65. Id. at 1636.
66. Id. at 1637.
67. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
68. G. STO E, L. SEmmA, C. SusTmN & M. Tusm4ar, CONST=ONAL LAw 115-16 (1986).
69. Id.
70. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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cision. In Weeks, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
fourth amendment had no value if the documents illegally seized from
a citizen could be used as evidence in federal court against that citizen.
7
'
Thus, the exclusionary rule emerged, wherein evidence seized by the
government in violation of a criminal defendant's fourth amendment
rights must be suppressed in the prosecution's case-in-chief against
that defendant.7 2 However, the Supreme Court refused to extend the
exclusionary rule to state court practice for nearly half a century.
For example, in Wolf v. Colorado7 3 the Supreme Court expressly
denied the extension of the rule where a criminal suspect is being
tried "in a State court for . . . [violation of a] State crime. .. .74
Ultimately, however, the Wolf holding was overruled by the 1961
case of Mapp v. Ohio, 75 in which the Supreme Court held that ev-
idence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is to be ex-
cluded at a state court criminal trial. 76 With the Weeks and Mapp
decisions, the Supreme Court created a powerful tool to be used in
the protection of individual rights of criminal suspects.77 Yet, the
Court had to be wary of the possible abuse of this tool. After all,
evidence illegally obtained is still credible evidence that a crime has
been committed.
B. Maintaining a Balance
In its construction of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court
must seek to maintain a balance "which will preserve the fundamental
safeguard which the Amendment was designed to secure, and at the
same time not unduly fetter the arm of the Government in the en-
71. Id. at 393.
72. The exclusionary rule "commands that where evidence has been obtained in violation of the
privileges guaranteed by the U[nited] S[tates] Constitution, the evidence must be excluded at trial."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 712 (5th ed. 1979).
73. 'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
74. Id. at 33.
75. Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
76. Id. at 643.
77. The exclusionary rule serves as an efficient tool in the protection of an individual's rights by
forcing the suppression of evidence seized by police in violation of a criminal suspect's Fourth Amend-
ment rights. When damaging evidence against the defendant is not admitted at trial because a police
officer violated the defendant's constitutional rights, the prosecution is greatly disadvantaged at trial.
Thus, the exclusionary rule serves as an effective deterrent to police from violating an individual's rights.
See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217-18 (1960).
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forcement of law."7 8 In other words, the Supreme Court has the
burdensome duty, whenever it is called upon to interpret the fourth
amendment, to strive toward the realization of two opposing goals:
it must protect individuals against unreasonable invasions of personal
privacy by the government while simultaneously aiding that very gov-
ernment in the conviction of criminals.
Because the amendment itself states that a person's home is a
place clearly deserving of protection from warrantless searches and
seizures, a private residence has always been afforded great protection
by the fourth amendment. 79 The Supreme Court articulated this prin-
ciple by stating that "[a]t the very core [of fourth amendment pro-
tection] stands the right of a man to retreat into his home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." 80 Over the years,
the Court has expanded the reach of this amendment far beyond the
confines of a person's home in the context of a criminal suspect's
individual rights to include a business office,81 a friend's apartment, 2
a taxicab,83 a motel room,s4 and, finally, a public telephone booth. 5
Thus, during the 1960's, the Court appeared to be giving much more
deference to personal privacy than it was to law enforcement.8 6
However, the late 1960's was a time of political and social unrest.
It was an era marked by "violence in the ghettos and disorder on
the campuses, political assassinations and near-assassinations, ever-
soaring crime statistics and widespread criticism of the [Supreme]
Court... "87 Members of society, generally, had grave concerns
that our country was experiencing a complete breakdown of law and
order. Richard Nixon, as a 1968 presidential candidate, was quick to
78. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 452 (1928), overruled, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (from
the argument for the United States).
79. See W. LAFAVE, SEARcH AND SEIzuRE: A TRAanoS oN Tim FouRTH AmmNrmETrr, § 2.3 (1978).
80. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
81. Sliverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
82. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
83. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
84. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
85. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
86. Note, The United States Supreme Court's Erosion of Fourth Amendment Rights: The Trend
Continues, 30 S.D.L. Ray. 574, 575 (1985).
87. Kamisar, The Swing of the Pendulum, 239 NATION 262 (1984).
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exploit the growing fears of the citizenry and promised, if elected,
to appoint justices to the Court who would return law and order. 88
Nixon readily carried out this campaign promise by appointing four
such justices to the Court during his Presidency.89 With a new con-
servative majority, the Court was able to address the concerns of the
public by shifting the balance of fourth amendment interpretation
away from individual privacy rights of criminal suspects and by broadly
redefining the constitutional authority of law enforcement officials.
Recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with fourth amendment
interpretations are illustrative of the Court's shifting of the balance.
For example, in Smith v. Maryland,90 the Court held that the in-
stallation of a pen register by the telephone company at the request
of police in order to record the telephone numbers dialed from a
criminal suspect's home telephone did not violate the fourth amend-
ment because the defendant "entertained no actual expectation of
privacy in the phone numbers he dialed .. ."9" Likewise, in United
States v. Knotts,92 the Court found permissible the use by police of
an electronic beeper placed within a suspect's car in order to follow
the suspect to his private cabin.93 The Court further expanded police
authority in United States v. Jacobsen94 when it held that a Federal
Drug Enforcement agent may conduct the warrantless search of a
package which had already been opened by a private citizen, either
accidentally or deliberately. 95 Finally, the Court held in California v.
Ciraolo6 that although defendant Ciraolo clearly intended to maintain
the privacy of his yard, by completely surrounding his property with
a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence, his privacy expec-
tation was unreasonable. 97 The Court found that the acts of police
88. Id.
89. Schwartz, Fifteen Years of the Burger Court, 239 NATION 263 (1984). President Nixon made
the following appointments to the Supreme Court: Warren E. Burger in 1969, Harry A. Blackmun in
1970, and William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell in 1972.
90. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
91. Id. at 745.
92. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
93. Id.
94. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
95. Id. at 115.
96. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
97. Id. at 214.
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in conducting a warrantless aerial observation of Ciraolo's yard from
an altitude of 1,000 feet, in discovering marijuana plants growing
there, and in using evidence thus obtained against Ciraolo did not
infringe upon his fourth amendment rights.98 Therefore, when viewed
in light of the Court's growing trend of limiting individual rights,
the California v. Greenwood decision appears to have been some-
what predictable.
IV. ANALYsis
Justice White, writing for the majority, and Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the dissent, agreed as to the appropriate test to be applied
in fourth amendment analysis: an individual must manifest a sub-
jective expectation of the privacy in the item to be searched which
society accepts as objectively reasonable. 10° However, they sharply dis-
agreed as to the results of that test. In the majority opinion, Justice
White stated that Greenwood's expectation of privacy in the contents
of these plastic bags was unreasonable because Greenwood himself
"exposed . . . [his] garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat...
[his] claim to Fourth Amendment protection."' 0'1 This is an interest-
ing, although somewhat unfounded, conclusion by the Court, con-
sidering the fact that Greenwood purposefully placed his garbage
within the protected confines of nontransparent, sealed plastic bags.
Greenwood actually exposed nothing to the public except the exteriors
of these opaque containers. 10 2
Justice White gave great weight to the fact that the thin plastic
walls of the trash bags are easily punctured and that the content of
these bags is, therefore, readily accessible to any member of the public
who chooses to break them open. However, the majority failed to
recognize that in the 1981 decision Robbins v. California,03 the Court
held that packages wrapped in green plastic, identical to Greenwood's
plastic bags, deserved fourth amendment protection.' 4
98. Id. at 215.
99. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625.
100. Id. at 1628.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1636.
103. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
104. Id.
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In Robbins, the Court was not concerned with the ease in which
the plastic covering of the packages could be disturbed, but rather
with the extent to which the contents of those packages could be
reasonably inferred from their outward appearance. 05 The Court
stated, "[I]f the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its
contents, the contents cannot fairly be said to have been removed
from a searching officer's view. The same would be true . . . if the
container were transparent, or otherwise clearly revealed its con-
tents."10 6 For example, a gun case does not deserve fourth amendment
protection because it can be easily inferred by the officers that it
contains a gun.07 On the other hand, the cigarbox-sized blocks of
marijuana at issue in Robbins were wrapped in green plastic and did
not adequately reveal their contents to police. Therefore, the blocks
retained fourth amendment protection. 0 8
Had Justice White applied the Robbins rule, he would likely have
concluded that nothing about the outward appearance of Green-
wood's garbage bags indicated that they contained anything other
than garbage. In fact, Greenwood's garbage bags looked like all filled
garbage bags; they had no distinctive configuration indicating that
they contained anything illegal. As Justice Brennan pointed out in
his dissent, Greenwood did not flaunt the intimate contents of these
bags "by strewing his trash all over the curb for all to see... ."09
In fact, the bags adequately hid their contents from the world until
they were opened by the police investigators." 0
Justice Brennan argued that the police acted unreasonably in re-
vealing the private contents of these bags to the public on numerous
occasions."' In their attempt to uncover evidence against Greenwood,
the police clawed through his garbage just outside his home "[e]very
week for two months, and at least once more a month later,....
[while] [c]omplete strangers minutely scrutinized their bounty, un-
105. Id. at 427.
106. Id.
107. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979).
108. Id. at 428.
109. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1636.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1631.
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doubtedly dredging up intimate details of Greenwood's private life
and habits.' 1 12 This intrusive behavior proceeded without a warrant,
and "no court before or since has concluded that the police acted
on probable cause to believe that Greenwood was engaged in any
criminal activity."" 3 Thus, Justice Brennan concluded that the police
acted contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior
and that such behavior should not be condoned by the Supreme
Court." 4 Clearly, the dissent has the more convincing argument on
this point.
Greenwood should not be faulted for placing his garbage bags on
the street at a specific time for the express purpose of having a gar-
bage collector remove them in a timely fashion because a county
ordinance required him to dispose of his waste in this fashion." 5 Yet,
the majority gave special consideration to the fact that Greenwood
placed his garbage on the curb to convey it to a third party, the
collector, who might have compromised the privacy of the bags him-
self or might have allowed someone else, like the police, to do so.116
At first blush, this appears to be a relatively logical argument,
especially in light of the rule Justice White quoted from Smith v.
Maryland,"7 stating that "a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in infoimation he voluntarily turns over to a third party."" 8
However, the majority misapplied this rule to the situation at hand.
In Smith, the police were merely collecting a list of telephone numbers
corresponding to calls placed by the suspect from his home telephone
rather than listening in on the private conversations." 9 Thus, the Court
reasoned that although Smith may have fully intended "to keep the
contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could
not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he
dialed." 120
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1631-32.
114. Id. at 1632.
115. ORANGE COuNWry CODE § 4-3-45(a) (1986).
116. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629.
117. Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
118. Id. at 743-44.
119. Id. at 741.
120. Id. at 743.
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Following this reasoning, the contents of Smith's telephone con-
versations are analogous to the contents of Greenwood's bags, and
the number dialed by Smith equates to the outside lining of the gar-
bage bags. Therefore, if the Court had correctly applied the Smith
reasoning in the Greenwood context, it might have held that In-
spectors Stracner and Rahaeuser were free to collect statistical data
on the number, size, and color of trash bags Greenwood regularly
placed on the street in front of his home and nothing more, for that
truly constitutes the full extent of information Greenwood volun-
teered. The contents of Greenwood's bags, like the contents of Smith's
telephone conversations, were intended to remain private.
Justice Brennan also challenged the majority by stating that "vol-
untary relinquishment of possession or control over an effect does
not necessarily amount to a relinquishment of a privacy expectation
in it.121 He likened Greenwood's surrender of his garbage to the
bailment of a letter or package, which is dropped into a "mall box
or other depository with the 'express purpose' of entrusting it to the
postal officer or a private carrier .... ,,1 Justice Brennan noted that
postal bailees certainly have more incentive to sort through the per-
sonal items entrusted to them than do garbage collectors; therefore,
one might expect a relinquishment to occur when one uses the postal
service. 23 However, for 110 years, since the Supreme Court decision
in Ex parte Jackson,'14 no relinquishment has been found, and police
have been precluded from the warrantless search of packages and
letters.125
Justice Brennan's argument, although not without some merit, is
not entirely sound either. There is clearly a distinction to be made
between mail and garbage. Unlike garbage, mail is highly protected
by the United States Constitution, which vests Congress with the power
to establish post offices and post roads. 26
121. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1637.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
125. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1637.
126. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, c. 7.
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An important reason cited by Justice White for the Court's ma-
jority decision was the persuasive number of lower court decisions
rejecting similar claims of fourth amendment protection of garbage. 127
Justice White argued that these lower court interpretations serve as
an indication of society's inability to accept as reasonable an indi-
vidual's claim to a privacy expectation "in trash left for collection
in an area accessible to the public. . . ."2, This is a fairly sound
argument. Juries are comprised of individual members of society, and
jury verdicts generally are reflective of public sentiment. Therefore,
if members of society held such a privacy interest in high regard, this
interest would be reflected in lower court decisions.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan was apparently most concerned
about the potential for discovery of highly personal details of one's
life by searching an individual's refuse. Citing Oliver v. United States, 29
Justice Brennan contended that a sealed trash bag should be extended
fourth amendment protection because, without doubt, a sealed trash
bag harbors telling evidence of the "intimate activities associated with
the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life[.]' "130 Justice
Brennan, thus, indicates that the rule established by the majority is
highly susceptible to abuse because it appears to give intruding neigh-
bors, reporters, and detectives carte blanche license to "scrutiniz[e]
our sealed trash containers to discover some detail of our personal
lives." ' 13' By refusing to recognize as reasonable any expectation of
privacy in garbage under the fourth amendment, there is a distinct
possibility that the Supreme Court has, likewise, effectively precluded
citizens from stating causes of action in tort against similar intrusions
by nongovernmental persons. This is especially frightening in light of
the fact that "almost every human activity ultimately manifests itself
in waste products .... ,,3
V. CONCLUSION
The tension between the majority and dissenting opinions in
Greenwood is representative of the tension inherent in all fourth
127. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629.
128. Id.
129. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
130. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634.
131. Id. at 1635.
132. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 798 (1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1983).
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amendment analyses. The Court is asked to assume opposing duties
in the determination of the legality of warrantless searches and sei-
zures. It must act as a protector of the individual rights of the United
States citizenry while simultaneously granting governmental authority
to protect the citizenry from crime. In order to maintain this delicate
balance, the Court, which is theoretically insulated from political pres-
sures in its interpretation of the Constitution, must realistically weigh
the ever changing moods and needs of society in order to interpret
the fourth amendment more liberally or more narrowly as the times
might dictate to be necessary.
The Greenwood holding is in keeping with a recent trend by the
Court to narrow the scope of the fourth amendment and to give
greater freedom to law enforcement. Because the vast majority of
lower courts had addressed this issue earlier and had held that a
person possesses no Constitutionally protected interest in his garbage,
the Supreme Court holding in Greenwood will likely have little impact
upon members of society. On the other hand, there is great potential
for the abuse of Greenwood because the decision fails to recognize
any reasonable expectation of privacy in the telling items Americans
throw away. Thus, those who wish to protect themselves from such
abuse and to maintain privacy in their garbage must resort to other,
more expensive, self-help measures such as an investment in a trash
compactor or a paper shredder.
Richard H. Taylor
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